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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20061121-CA

MICHAEL WILLAM KISSELL,

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION

Appellant appeals from the trial court's Order denying his Petition for Relief
Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and a Memorandum in Support of Petition for

Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (collectively, the "Petition'*) entered
April 5, 2005, in this case involving his convictions in the Seventh Judicial District Court

for the County ofGrand, State of Utah, for five (5) counts of Dealing in Material Harmful
to a Minor, all third-degree felonies. A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Addendum

•A" and incorporated herein by this reference.

The Utah Court of Appeals has

jurisdiction over this appeal in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-2a-3(2)(e)
and UT. R. APP. P. 3(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OR REVIEW

ISSUE #1: Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's Petition for Relief under
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act challenging the trial court's reliance upon irrelevant
and unreliable evidence and information when sentencing the Appellant?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Generally, an appeal from a judgment on a petition

for post-conviction relief raises questions of law reviewed for correctness, giving no
deference to the post-conviction court's conclusion." Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72,

f7, 61 P.3d 978. "This Court traditionally afford[s] the trial court wide latitude and
discretion in sentencing. State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah, 1997). Generally,
we will reverse a trial court's sentencing decision only if it is an abuse of the judge's
discretion. State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989). A trial court abuses its

discretion in sentencing when, among other things, it fails to consider all legally relevant
factors." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 18, 40 P.3d 626 {quoting Gibbons, 779 P.2d at

1135). "A court abuses its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences only if no

reasonable [person] would take the view by the [sentencing] court." State v^Ttiorkelson,
2004 UT App 9, %\2, 84 P.3d 854, {quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah
1978)).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
I.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AMEND. XIV

II.

UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. I § 7

III.

UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. I § 24

IV.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401

V.

UT.R.CIV.P. 65(c)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 27, 2004, Michael William Kisscll (hereinafter "Kissell') was charged
by Information in the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for Grand County. State of
Utah, with forcible sexual abuse, a second-degree felony; thirty-four (34) counts of

dealing in harmful material, all third-degree felonies under Utah CODE Ann. §76-101206, allowing for a separate charge for each article allegedly exhibited; and contributing
to the delinquency of a minor, a Class B misdemeanor. R0013-R0014. On November 8,

2004, Kissell was charged by Amended Information with forcible sexual abuse, a seconddegree felony; thirty-four (34) counts of dealing in harmful material to a minor, all thirddegree felonies; and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class B misdemeanor.
R0014.

On March 1, 2005, Kissell filed his Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty

Plea and Certificate of Counsel, pleading guilty to five (5) separate counts of dealing in
harmful material to a minor pursuant to a plea agreement with the State of Utah
("State"), with the remainder of the charges dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations. Id.
On April 5, 2005, the trial court sentenced Kissell to five (5) zero to five (0-5) year terms

to be served consecutively in the Utah State Prison, and entered its Judgment and
Commitment to Utah State Prison (the Judgment') in this matter. R0029.

On July 14, 2006, Kissell filed a Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act and a Memorandum in Support of Petition for Relief Under the Post-

Conviction Remedies Act, challenging that the trial court had relied upon irrelevant and
unreliable evidence and information in sentencing Appellant to consecutive terms.

R0005 and R0013. On October 20, 2006, the trial court entered its Order denying
Kissell's Petition. R0032- R0033. On November 8, 2006, Kissell, timely filed his Notice

ofAppeal from the Order denying the Petitioa R0035.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On November 8, 2004, Kissell was charged by Amended Information with forcible

sexual abuse, a second-degree felony; thirty-four (34) counts of dealing in harmful
material to a minor, all third-degree felonies; and contributing to the delinquency of a

minor, a class B misdemeanor. R0014. On March 1, 2005, Kissell filed his Statement of

Defendant in Support ofGuilty Plea and Certificate ofCounsel, pleading guilty to five
(5) separate counts ofdealing in harmful material to a minor pursuant to a plea agreement
with the State, with the remainder of the charges dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations.
Id.

On April 5, 2005, Kissell appeared for sentencing before the Honorable Lyle R.
Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah.

At sentencing, Kissell was remorseful and apologized to the victim's family for what he
had done. He had mimimal prior criminal history, the crimes committed were non-violent
crimes, and he had appeared at all scheduled hearings in this matter. Additionally, Kissell
has maintained employment and has been a productive member of the comraunity. Many

letters were written by his neighbors and friends in support of Kissell which showed that

he had a good reputation and a great job history. The prosecution and defense counsel as
well as Adult Probation and Parole, who had prepared a pre-sentence investigation report,
believed that Kissell should receive concurrent sentences.At the sentencing hearing, prior

to entering the sentence, Judge Anderson set forth the following analysis of factors he
used in determining Kissell's sentence:

THE COURT: "You're - you're bisexual, Mr. Kissell, ah,

so you're aroused by the idea of sexual contact with people of
either sex; —"
MR. KISSELL:

Yes, sir."

THE COURT: "--is that right?"
MR. KISSELL:

'Yes, sir."

THE COURT: Ah, but you understand that, ah most heter- - well, all heterosexuals, I think, prefer to be heterosexual,

and - and probably a very substantial portion of those people
who, ah, are attracted to persons of the same sex wish that
were not the case because of they see the effect that it has on
their own lives and on their own families.

And it's still

difficult, even in America today, to fit in with the templates of
family life. Ah, even as loose as they've become it's difficult
for those people."

"And I—T hear it all the time, you know: 'Do you think I
would choose to be this way? I must be born this way. No
one would choose this,' so."

"And then there's this controversy. Ah, do we need to keep

people who are attracted to persons of the same sex away
from our children because they may try to recruit our
children?"

"And now you're a poster boy for those people who want to

keep persons attracted to people of the same sex away from
their children. You're a poster boy now for them, because
you did exactly what everyone fears."

"I don't think the most open minded parents out there would
choose a homosexual life over a heterosexual life for their

children, ah, then - even if they, once confronted it, they're

accepting and -loving and caring. So this is this is what
bothers me about this the most is that, ah you're - you're not

only got involved with someone who's underage, but it was in
a way that's going to create and confuse - a very substantial
likelihood of confused sexual identity for this person."

"Why am I? Why - why was I?"

"And you used - using heterosexual images to stir up sexual
desire, and then turning it to your own advantage. So I mean

I - I think you have to understand why the Keoughs must be
absolutely furious with you."
MR. KISSELL: "I do, your Honor."

THE COURT: "Ah, I'm going to give you a prison sentence

here and I'm going to impose these terms consecutively to

give the Board of Pardons the option of keeping you for as
long as 25 years, if you - if you're stonewallin' on your
treatment."

"1 - I have a concern, if 1 give a concurrent - if I give
concurrent sentences here, that you may reach a point where

they're confronting you in your treatment and you decide to
just bail out of the treatment and survive five years. I'm—
I'm not gonna give you that option. So you're going to have
to be very consecutive and, ah, if they're - if they're willing
to actually hold your feet to the fire, ah, they'll - subject to
the budget limitations that they have, I'm sure, I'm gonna
give 'em all the discretion they need to make sure that you, ah
- you not ever do this again. At least create the greatest
likelihood of that."

Sentencing Tr. at pp. 10-12. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced

Kissell to five (5) zero to five (0-5) year terms to be served consecutively in the Utah
State Prison, and entered the Judgment in this matter. R0029.

On July 14, 2006, having exhausted all potential appellate remedies, Kissell filed a

Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and a Memorandum in

Support ofPetition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act Act, challenging
that the trial court had. relied upon irrelevant and unreliable evidence and information in

sentencing Appellant to consecutive terms. R0005 and ROOl 3. On October 20., 2006, the
trial court entered its Order denying Kissell's Petition. R0032- R0033. On November 8.

2006, Kissell, timely filed his Notice of Appeal from the Order denying the Petition.
R0035.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401 states that "[aj court shall determine, if a defendant
has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent
or consecutive sentences for the offenses." The Utah Code mandates that, "[a] court shall

consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive
sentences." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-401(4)( 1999).

In this matter, the trial court erred by relying upon irrelevant and unreliable
evidence in sentencing Appellant to five (5) zero to five year sentences consecutive to
one another. In attempt to correct such error, Appellant filed his Petition for post
conviction relief pursuant to UT. R. Civ. P. 65. The trial court subsequently denied the

reliefrequested in the Petition, relying again upon irrelevant and unreliable evidence as a
basis for such denial. The trial court erroneously sentenced Appellant to consecutive

sentences and then supported that determination with the denial of the Petition on the
same basis. Such determinations should be overturned by this Court for the reasons
stated below.

ARGUMENT

I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RELYING ON IRRELEVANT AND
UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE IN SENTENCING THE APPELLANT
In State v. Wanosik, the Utah Court of Appeals held that, "ftjhe due process clause

of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a sentencing judge act on

reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a
sentence" Ibid., 2001 UT App 241, 134, 31 P.3d 615, citing State v. Howell, 707 P.2d

115, 118 (Utah 1985). UT. R. Crim. P. 22(a) sets forth procedures for ensuring a
defendant's right to be sentenced based upon relevant and reliable information, stating as
follows:

Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an

opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should
not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity
to present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
However, the Utah Court of Appeals has recognized that "[although [UT. R. Crim. P.]
22(a) implements sound procedures aimed at insuring that the trial court bases its

sentencing decision on such information, a criminal defendant's right to be sentenced
based on relevant and reliable information regarding his crime, his background, and the

interests of society stands independent of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a)."
Wanosik, supra.

"A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of

his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which
underlie the criminal justice system." Wanosik, citing State v. McClcndon, 611 P.2d

728, 729 (Utah 1980). "'[T]he sentencing judge[ ][has] discretion in determining what

punishment fits both the crime and the offender,' but [the Utah appellate courts] have
consistently sought 'to shore up the soundness and reliability of the factual basis upon
which thejudge must rely in the exercise of that sentencing discretion.'" Id., citing State
v. Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980) (requiring disclosure of presentence report to
defendant prior to sentencing).

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401 sets forth the following with respect to the trial
court's authority to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences:

A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more

than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall

indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: (a) if the sentences

imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and (b) if
the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with

any other sentences the defendant is already serving. (2) In determining
whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court

shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of
victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant.

The Utah Supreme Court has long determined that this statute favors concurrent

sentences. See, State v. Strunk. 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993); State v. Galli, 967
P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998). As it pertains to the imposition of consecutive sentences.

"[t]he Utah Code mandates: 'A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the
offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in

determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.'" State v. Perez, 52 P.3d 451,1143,
2002 UT App 211. citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401(4) (1999).

In Perez, this Court acknowledged the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

401(4), explaining that consideration of certain factors in a determination ofconsecutive
sentences is necessary:

The only comment at the sentencing hearing that could be construed as
touching on Perez's history, character, or rehabilitative needs is defense
counsel's statement that Perez was not on probation at the time of the
incident. The trial court's brief commentary dealt only with the "gravity and
circumstances of the offenses," and did not explicitly address the

presentence report's recommendation of concurrent sentences. In short,
there is nothing in this record to indicate that the trial court "consider! ed]
the ... history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences." Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-401(4) (1999).
Perez, at 148.

Our appellate courts are not without experience in this area oflaw, having handed
down decisions in several cases in which a defendant was considered to have been

appropriately or inappropriately consecutively sentenced after trial court determination of
the individual circumstances. Many of these circumstances are similar to those that are
present in the instant matter.

In State v. McGinnis, 2006 UT App. 85, ^11, the district court weighed

McGinnis's lengthy criminal history, his failure to attend court appearances in the present
case; and his lengthy, unsuccessful parole history against his rehabilitation needs; the AP
& P recommendation; and his professed desire to pursue drug rehabilitation. Under the

facts of McGinnis's case, this Court determined that the trial court had not abused its

discretion in sentencing McGinnis to consecutive sentences in the two cases, rather than

ordering concurrent terms or probation and rehabilitation. Because the terms were within

10

the statutory parameters for the offenses, this Court concluded that the terms were not

unfair or unnecessarily harsh. Unlike McGinnis, Kissell did not have a lengthy criminal
history, attended all court appearances, and did not have a parole history.
In State v. Galli, our Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court had abused its

discretion in imposing consecutive sentences because of its refusal to give weight to
certain mitigating evidence. Ibid., 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998). Such mitigating
evidence included Galli's use of a pellet gun rather than a real gun, Galli's voluntary
confession to the offenses he committed, and his likelihood of rehabilitation.

Id.

Similarly, Kissell herein also entered what was tantamount to a confession by pleading
guilty to five (5) of the charges, weighing in favor of rehabilitation and an order requiring
the sentences to be served concurrently.

In State v. Montova. 929 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1996), Montoya relied on two Utah

Supreme Court cases in support of his consecutive sentencing challenge: State v. Smith,
909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), and State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993). In Smith, the
defendant was convicted of four first degree felonies: aggravated kidnapping, rape of a

child, and two counts of sodomy on a child. Ibid, at 238. On each of the four counts, the

trial judge imposed a sentence of fifteen-years-to-life, the greatest minimum mandatory
sentence available, and ordered that the sentences run consecutively. Id. In vacating the

trial court's sentencing determination, the Utah Supreme Court declared that a "highly
important factor in deciding whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences is

that the Legislature ... has opted to give the Board ofPardons wide latitude in deciding
what a maximum sentence ought to be." Smith at 244. The Court noted that, "[tjhe Board
11

of Pardons is in a far better position than a court to monitor a defendant's subsequent

behavior and possible progress toward rehabilitation while in prison and to adjust the
maximum sentence accordingly." Id.

Hence, because the minimum mandatory sixty-

year sentence imposed was deemed tantamount to aminimum mandatory life sentence,"
depriving the Board of "discretion to release defendant, irrespective ofhis progress," the
Utah Supreme Court declared the trial judge's sentencing decision "unreasonable and an
abuse of discretion," and remanded the case for re-sentencing. Id.

In Strunk, the defendant was convicted of the capital offense of first degree

murder, as well as child kidnapping and aggravated sexual abuse of a child, both first

degree felonies carrying minimum mandatory sentences. Strunk was sentenced to life
imprisonment for the capital offense and received minimum mandatory fifteen-year and
nine-year sentences for the kidnapping and sexual abuse offenses, with all three sentences
ordered to run consecutively. Ibid, 846 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Utah 1993). Our Utah Supreme
Court ruled that the trial court "abused its discretion in failing to sufficiently consider

defendant's rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of prior
violent crimes," because "the twenty-four year term robs the Board of Pardons of any
flexibility to parole Strunk sooner." Id. at 1301-1302.
In the instant matter, Kissell was sentenced to five (5) zero to five (0-5) year terms

consecutively. Although it is within the trial court's discretion to sentence Kissell as they
see fit, they must bast; their discretion on the criteria as set forth supra in Utah Code

Ann. §76-3-401. Evidence and information was presented at sentencing that met the
criteria set forth in Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401. At sentencing, Kissell was remorseful
12

and apologized to the victim's family for what he had done. He had minimal prior

criminal history, the crimes committed were non-violent crimes, and he had appeared at
all scheduled hearings in this matter. Additionally, Kissell maintained employment and is

a productive member of the community. Many letters were written by his neighbors and
friends in support of Kissell which showed that he had a good reputation and a great job
history. The prosecution and defense counsel, as well as Adult Probation and Parole who
had prepared a pre-sentence investigation report, believed that Kissell should receive
concurrent sentences. The trial court, however, deviated from such recommendations.

The rehabilitative needs of Kissell were also part of the evidence and information
that the trial court was to take under consideration in determining whether to order

consecutive or concurrent sentences.

Kissell was very cooperative during his legal

proceedings and was apologetic and remorseful. This behavior is supportive of Kissell
doing well in rehabilitation and following through with his rehabilitation. He is more
likely to rehabilitate quickly and return to be a productive member of society, which is

contradictory of the trial court's assumption at sentencing that Kissell would "stonewall"
on his treatment. There was no evidence presented to show that Kissell would not be

cooperative in rehabilitation. At the sentencing hearing the trial court stated that:
Ah, I'm going to give you a prison sentence here and I'm going to impose
these terms consecutively to give the Board of Pardons the option of
keeping you for as long as 25 years, if you - if you're stonewallin" on your
treatment. I - I have a concern if I give you a concurrent - if I give you
concurrent sentences here, that you may reach a point where they're
confronting you in your treatment and you decide to just bail out of the
treatment and survive the five years. I'm - I'm not gonna give you that

option. So your going to have to be very cooperative and, ah. if they're - if
they're willing to actually hold your feet to the fire, ah , they'll - subject to
13

the budget limitations that they have, I'm sure, I'm gonna give 'em all the
discretion they need to make sure that you, ah - you not ever do this again.
At least create the greatest likelihood of that.

R044 at p. 12. None of the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing in this matter
leaned toward the possibility that Kissell would not be easily and quickly rehabilitated.
In fact, the evidence presented was quite the opposite.

Kissell was remorseful,

apologetic, and cooperative, which evidenced extreme support for the contention that
Kissell would not "stonewall" on his treatment and would rehabilitate quickly and

effectively. Clearly, the trial court relied upon irrelevant or unreliable information in its
determination to impose consecutive sentences.

A.

Kissell's Equal Protection Rights were Violated by the Imposition of
Consecutive Sentences.

The Utah Court of Appeals has recently held that the federal Equal Protection

Clause embodies the general principle that "...persons similarly situated should be treated

similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their
circumstances were the same." State ex. rel. Z.C, 2005 UT App 562,18, 128 P.3d 561;
U.S.C.A. CONST.AMEND. 14; U.C.A. Const.Art. I § 24. The Utah appellate courts have

long recognized that "Concurrent sentences are favored over consecutive ones," State v.
Perez, 52 P.3d 451, ^-3, 2002 UT App 211; see. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah
1998). Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(4)

Similar to Wariosik, supra, in a recent case out of Pennsylvania, their superior
court held as follows:

[Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing
judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest
14

abuse of discretion. To constitute an abuse of discretion, the sentence

imposed must either exceed the statutory limits or be manifestly excessive.
In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in
judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a
manifestly unreasonable decision. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 828 A.2d
1126, 1128 (Pa.Super.2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted)."

Com, v. Perry 883 A.2d 599, (Pa.Super.,2005). Also similar to Wanosik. supra, a Kansas
appellate court similarly indicated as follows:

[A]n appellate court will not disturb a sentence that complies with the
statutory guidelines if it is within the trial court's discretion and not a result
of partiality, prejudice, or corrupt motive. Judicial discretion is abused
when the trial court's decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; that is,
no reasonable person would take the trial court's view."

State v. Huff. 31 Kan.App.2d 717. 71 P.3d 1185, (Kan.App.,2003), citing State v.
Chastain. 265 Kan. 16, 22, 960 P.2d 756 (1998); State v. Vanderveen. 259 Kan. 836, 843,

915 P.2d 57 (1996). Sentencing should be based upon "reasonably reliant and relevant"
information and not on "reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will." Nor should the

decision be "...manifestly unreasonable," "arbitrary," "fanciful" or one that "no

reasonable person" would make. Huff. Perry, Wanosik, supra. Circuit Judge Aldisert of
the United States 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals stated in a concurring opinion as follows:
Herbert Wechsler reminded us that a court is "bound to function otherwise

than as a naked power organ," and for decisions to have any legal quality,
their determinations must be "entirely principled."[FN18] Any court must

always distinguish between the cultivated personal tastes of its members
and generally accepted concepts of moral obligation. In discussing the
"common morality of society,"' Dean Rostow reminds us that "in the life of
the law, especially in a common law country, the customs, the common
views, and the habitual patterns of the people's behavior properly count for
much ...."1FN19| In his perception of conventional morality, H.L.A. Hart
distinguishes between standards of conduct that arc widely shared in a
15

particular society and moral principles or ideals 'Svhich may govern an
individual's life, but which he does not share with any considerable
numbers of those with whom he lives.[FN20| I do not believe that the Court

paid sufficient respect to either of these salutary considerations.
FN18. H. Wechsler, Principles, Politics and Constitutional Law 27 (1961).
FN19. Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 Camb.L.J. 174, 197.
FN20. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 165 (1961).
Loughnev v. Hickey, 635 F.2d 1063, 1069-1070 (C.A.3 1980), Circuit Judge Aldisert
concurring.

In Utah, there are many cases were the defendants were charged with the same
crime to which Kissell pled guilty, but who received cither lesser sentences or probation
and a fine. In State v. Haltom, Haltom was found guilty of selling an adult video to

minor and was convicted of dealing harmful material to a minor and sentenced to 0-5

years, which sentence was suspended and he was ordered to serve 30 days and probation.
Ibid., 2005 UT App 348, 121 P.3d 42. In State v. Brown, the defendant was convicted of

showing a pornographic video to a minor, and the trial court sentenced him to five years
imprisonment and imposed a $5000.00 fine. 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App.,1993). The trial
court in Brown's case then stayed the sentence, placing defendant on probation subject to

his serving the fourteen (14) day minimum mandatory sentence and abiding by other
probation conditions. Id. Another example is found in State v. Vigil, where Vigil was
convicted of dealing harmful material to a minor and was fined $12,650 and sentenced to
two terms of 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison and one year in the Davis County Jail to
be served concurrently. 840 P.2d 788 (Utah App., 1992).

It appears in Utah caselaw that consecutive sentences are typically imposed only
in situations where a violent crime accompanies the charge of dealing in harmful material
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to a minor. For example, in State v. Helms, the trial court sentenced Helms to three years
to life in prison for both counts of aggravated sexual assault and zero to five years in
prison for each of the three counts of dealing in harmful material to a child. Ibid., 2002
UT 12, 40 P.3d 626. The Helms trial court ordered that Helms serve the five sentences

consecutively, obviously based on the trial court's concern over Helms" safety to the
community.

In the instant matter, Kissell was not treated as those who had been in a similar
situation were. The trial court undertook an irrelevant and unreliable colloquy respecting

homosexual versus heterosexual lifestyles, with an emphasis towards the latter and

attributing a greater degree of harm to the victim based upon Kissell's lifestyle
preference. Sentencing Tr. at pp. 10-12. The trial court reiterated this in the Order
denying the Petition when it stated that it viewed the acts at issue herein with a greater

degree of harm stating that, "[t]he victim of petitioner was of the same sex as petitioner,
which has made the victim's trauma even greater and recovery more problematic." See,
Addendum "A." While a judge is authorized and expected to undertake moral judgments
in our society with respect to actions taken by individuals, those actions are typically

attributable to crime and punishment on the basis that they are determined to be illegal or

against the greater moral conscience by ruling of our legislative body in codifying such
on our behalves.

Ajudge, however, is neither authorized nor expected to render a determination for
sentencing or otherwise that is based upon his personal moral beliefs, particularly when
society appears accepting of both sides of the issue and such actions are not considered
17

either illegal or immoral by a great majority of lawmakers or judges themselves,

evidenced by a lack of codification of any such actions as illegal. While Kissell's actions

with respect to the victim were codified as illegal based upon the age of the victim, Judge
Anderson's colloquy clearly indicates that age was not the only determining factor in

ordering consecutive sentences, evidencing possible partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will
towards Kissell.

In the cases listed supra, Haltom, Vigil and Brown were either given concurrent

sentences or put on probation for committing similar crimes to the one at issue herein.
Only in violent crime situations such as Helms has a similar punishment been afforded to
someone guilty of the crimes at issue herein. Kissell was unreasonably sentenced to up to

(25) twenty-five years in prison for a crime that was non-violent, and particularly when
he did not have any previous criminal history and was apologetic and remorseful for what
had occurred. Because Kissell had committed the same crime as the cases cited supra,

but received excessive punishment for such, his equal protection rights have been
violated. U.S.C.A. CONST.AMEND. 14; U.C.A. Const.Art. I § 24.
B.

Kissell's Due Process Rights Were Violated Because the Judge Relied upon
Irrlevant and Unreliable Information at the Sentencing.

In Wanosik, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals held that: "[tine due process clause
of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a sentencing judge act on

reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a
sentence." 31 P.3d 615, 428 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2001 UT App 241, citing State v.
Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985).

Wanosik's due process rights were

compromised by the trial court's failure to base its sentencing decision on relevant and
reliable information regarding the crime, Wanosik's background, and the interests of
society.

Kissell's due process rights were violated because the trial court did not rely on
evidence that was reliable or reasonable in making their decision to sentence Kissell to

consecutive sentences. No evidence was presented at sentencing that showed that Kissell
would "stonewall" on his rehabilitation and not be quickly and effectively rehabilitated.

In fact, the opposite appears to be more accurate. Before even entering treatment, Kissell
had shown that he was amendable to rehabilitation by his apology to the victim and the

victim's family, his remorsefulness, and his cooperative behavior. Instead of receiving
acknowledgment for the steps he had taken towards rehabilitation on his own he was

unjustly laden with a sentence that could keep him in prison for up to twenty-five (25)

years. This sentence was based upon an assumption that he would "stonewall" on his
treatment and not be rehabilitated when no such character evidence was ever presented.

The trial court also appears to have given Kissell consecutive sentences because of
his admission that he was bi-sexual. This admission seems to have planted a seed in the
court's mind that because of these tendencies he would be harder to rehabilitate and may

"stonewall" on his treatment, causing the court to feel that he possibly needed to be put

away for a long period of time. Again no evidence was presented to show that this was
the case. It is clear that the intent behind Utah Codh Ann. §76-3-401 was to allow the
trial court to utilize relevant and reliable information in sentencing, while recognizing
that concurrent sentences are favored. See, Perez and Galli, supra. Kissell's due process
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rights were violated by failure to take into consideration relevant and reliable information
in determining the sentence.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
KISSELL'S PETITION

Utah CODE Ann. § 78-35a-101 is also known as the Post-Conviction Remedies
Act. UT. R. CIV. P. 65 (c) governs all petitions filed under the Post-Convict ion Remedies
Act and states as follows:

This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief
filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-Conviction
Remedies Act. (b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be
commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the district court in the
county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The petition
should be filed on forms provided by the court. The court may order a

change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the WTong
county. The court may order achange of venue on motion of aparty for the
convenience of the parties or witnesses.

In the instant matter, Kissell filed a Petition for Post-Conviction relief under UT. R.

CIV. P. 65c challenging that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive rather than
concurrent sentences. After the trial court reviewed the Petition, it entered an Order

denying the Petition. The Order articulated, in pertinent part, as follows:
The court articulated at the time of sentencing that it was imposing the

sentence consecutively in order to afford the Board of Pardons the latitude

to hold petitioner more than five years, not because the court expected or
even desired the Board to hold defendant longer than five years. Even with
this sentence, the Board will have discretion to release defendant at any

time, if he has successfully completed treatment and appears to be a low
risk to reoffend.

Petitioner obtained the benefit of a plea bargain which reduced his most

serious charged crime from a second degree felony to athird degree felony.
The victim of petitioner was of the same sex as petitioner, which has made
the victim's trauma even greater and recovery more problematic.
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Because defendant targeted a minor for a sexual offense, and his conduct

was persistent, the court wished to ensure that defendant not be released
without any effort at rehabilitation. The court imposed consecutive
sentences to reduce this risk, but expressly stated that this should not be
taken as a recommendation for a longer term if petitioner participates
productively in treatment. This does not exceed the court's discretion.
See, Addendum "A."

The trial court erred in denying the Petition because it did in fact err in imposing
consecutive sentences as argued supra because it relied upon irrelevant and unreliable

evidence in imposing sentence. Because of this error the trial court should have granted
Kissell's Petition and re-sentenced him to concurrent sentences. Therefore, the trial court

erred in denying Kissell's Petition.
CONCLUSION

Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Kissell respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial courts denial of his Post-Conviction Motion, set aside his current

consecutive sentences, and remand this matter for more appropriate sentencing.
DATED THIS 8th day of June. 2007.

K. Andrew Fitzgerald

Attorney for Michael William Kissell
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Addendum ~A~
Order, dated April 5, 2005

SEVENTH DISTRICT C^"

FILED

XT 2 0 ?•" CLERK OF THE COUR"

BY.

/SUL

Deputy

THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL WILLIAM KISSELL,
ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs

Case No.
THE

STATE

0607-140

OF UTAH,

Defendants,

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Petitioner has filed a petition for extraordinary relief

seeking a resentencing.

He argues that his sentence should be

concurrent instead of consecutive.

The court articulated at the

time of sentencing that it was imposing the sentences

consecutively in order to afford the Board of Pardons the

latitude to hold petitioner more than five years, not because the

court expected or even desired the Board to hold defendant longer

than five years.

Even with this sentence, the Board will have

discretion to release defendant at any time, if he has

successfully completed treatment and appears to be a low risk to
reoffend.

Petitioner obtained the benefit of a plea bargain which
reduced his most serious charged crime from a second degree

felony to a third degree felony.

The victim of petitioner was of
1

5h¥

the same sex as petitioner, which has made the victim's trauma
even greater and recovery more problematic.
Because defendant targeted a minor for a sexual offense,

his conduct was persistent,

and

the court wished to ensure that

defendant not be released without any effort at rehabilitation.
The court imposed consecutive sentences to reduce this risk,

but

expressly stated that this should not be taken as a

recommendation for a longer term if petitioner participates
productively in treatment.

This does not exceed the court's

discretion.

The petition for extraordinary relief is denied.

Dated

this^M

day of October,

2006

yle R. Anderson, DistricramM^!^^

?3
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Addendum ~B~
Sentencing Transcripts pp. 10-12

1

nature.

And, ah, he's, ah -- ah, has some very good

2

attributes about him.

3

a -- a terrible mistake here that,

4

his other good qualities,

5

consider

And he is, ah -- I believe he just made
ah,

I think detracts from

and we'd hope that the Court would

those.

6

THE COURT:

All right.

I'm trying to understand.

7

You're -- you're bisexual, Mr. Kissell,

8

by the idea of sexual contact with people of either sex;

9

MR.KISSELL:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR.

12

THE COURT:

KISSELL:

—

Yes,sir.

—

is that right?
Yes,

sir.

Ah, but you understand that,

all heterosexuals,

hetero- —

14

heterosexual, and -- and probably a very substantial portion

15

of those people who, ah, are attracted to persons of the same

16

sex wish that were not the case because of they see the effect

17

that it has on their own lives and on their own families.

18

it's still difficult, even in America today, to fit in with

19

the templates of family life.

20

become,

And

it's difficult for those people.

And I -- I hear it all the time, you know:

think I would choose to be this way?

23

No one would choose this,"

25

prefer to be

Ah, even as loose as they've

22

24

I think,

ah, most

13

21

well,

ah, so you're aroused

"Do you

I must be born this way.

so.

And then there's this controversy.

Ah, do we need

to keep people who are attracted to persons of the same sex
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
PAGE

1'

1

away from our children because they may try to recruit our

2

children?

3

And now you're a poster boy for those people who

4

want to keep persons attracted to people of the same sex away

5

from their children.

6

because you did exactly what everyone fears.

7

You're a poster boy now for them,

I don't think the most open minded parents out there

8

would choose a homosexual life over a heterosexual life for

9

their children, ah, then —

even if they, once confronted with

10

it, they're accepting and -- and loving and caring.

So this

11

is —

12

you're -- you're not only got involved with someone who's

13

underage, but it was in a way that's going to create and

14

confuse —

15

identity for this person.

this is what bothers me about this the most is that, ah,

a very substantial likelihood of confused sexual

16

"Why am I?

Why —

why was I?"

17

And you used -- using heterosexual images to stir up

18

sexual desire, and then turning it to your own advantage.

19

I mean I —

20

must be absolutely furious with you.

21

I think you have to understand why the Keoughs

MR.

KISSELL:

22

23

So

I do,

Your Honor.

COURT ORDER

THE COURT:

Ah, I'm going to give you a prison

24

sentence here and I'm going to impose these terms

25

consecutively to give the Board of Pardons the option of
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
PAGE
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1

keeping you for as long as 25 years, if you —

2

stonewallin*

3

if you're

on your treatment.

I -- I have a concern, if I give a concurrent —

if

4

I give concurrent sentences here, that you may reach a point

5

where they're confronting you in your treatment and you decide

6

to just bail out of the treatment and survive five years.

7

I'm —

8

have to be very cooperative and, ah, if they're -- if they're

9

willing to actually hold your feet to the fire, ah, they'll

10

subject to the budget limitations that they have, I'm sure,

11

I'm gonna give 'em all the discretion they need to make sure

12

that you, ah — you not ever do this again.

13

the greatest likelihood of that.

14

I'm not gonna give you that option.

So you're going to

At least create

So it's the judgment and sentence of the Court that

15

the defendant be incarcerated in the Utah State Prison for a

16

term not to exceed five years on each of these counts and that

17

those be served consecutively.

18
19

He's remanded to the custody of the Sheriff to be
transported to the prison to serve this sentence.

20

MR. FITZGERALD:

Judge, we've just got one request.

21

Mike has a blind dog that he's trying to make arrangements

22

for.

23

arrangement.

24

25

He's askin' if he could have 24 hours to — to make that

THE COURT:

I can't imagine what possibly — what

possible reason you had to think that you would not be going
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
PAGE
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Addendum ~C~
State v. McGinnis. 2006 UT App. 85

Wfestlaw
Not Reported in P.3d
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 496219 (Utah App.), 2006 UT App 85
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d)

Page 1

(stating abuse of discretion may occur if the actionsof
the sentencingjudge were inherently unfairor thejudge
imposed a clearly excessive sentence). In determining
whether to impose consecutive sentences, the court is
required to "consider the gravity and circumstances of

State v. McGinnis

Utah App„2006.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Douglas Troy MCGINNIS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20050141-CA.

March 2, 2006.

the offenses, the number of victims, and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant."
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-401(2) (2003).

Although McGinnis asserts that he was promised
concurrent sentences and probation, there is no record

support for the claim. McGinnis stated at the plea
colloquies that no sentencing promises hadbeenmade.
The record also reflects, and McGinnis concedes, that

he was advised by the court at the plea colloquies that
the court would not be bound by any sentencing
Eighth District, Duchesne Department, 031800097; The
Honorable A. Lynne Payne.
Julie George, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee.

promises. The claim that absence of a written plea
agreement supports the existence of a promise of
concurrent sentences as a condition of the plea bargain
is without merit. McGinnis also concedes that his
sentence was not excessive under the statutory limits.
McGinnis contends that his trial counsel was ineffective

Before Judges BILLINGS. DAVIS, and THORNE.

by failing to "reiterate the degree and benefit of the
drug rehabilitation program" andto adequately inform

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official

the court of relevant statutory factors. The record
reflects that both defense counsel and McGinnis himself

Publication)
PER CURIAM:

*1 Douglas Troy McGinnis appeals his sentence for
convictions in cases consolidated for sentencing.

McGinnis argues that the district court abused its
discretion by sentencing him to a prison term rather
than probation and by running the sentences in the two
cases consecutively to each other. Because he did not
preserve the claim in the district court, McGinnis
asserts plain error and ineffectiveness of his trial
counsel.

provided information atsentencing regarding his recent
participation in a drug rehabilitation program and his
intention to continue treatment. The court also
considered the recommendation ofAdult Probation and

Parole (AP & P) that McGinnis be sentenced to
probation in order to continue treatment. Counsel's
failure to "reiterate" information that was already
before the court was neither deficient performance nor

was it prejudicial to McGinnis. It follows that the
district court did not plainly err in failing to correct
counsel's performance.

l'A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the
trial court has abused its discretion, failed to consider

Based upon ourreview ofsentencing, we conclude that

all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that
exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861

the district court considered the factors relevant to

P.2d 454, 456 (Utah Ct.App.1993'): see also State v.
Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649. 651 (Utah Ci.Apd.1997)

sentencing. The court weighed McGinnis's lengthy
criminalhistory;his failureto attend courtappearances

in the present case; and his lengthy, unsuccessful parole

•2007 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Not Reported in P.3d

Page 2

Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 496219 (Utah App.), 2006 UT App 85
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d)

history against his rehabilitative needs; the AP & P
recommendation; and his professed desire to pursue
drug rehabilitation. Under the facts of this case, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
McGinnis to consecutive sentences in the two cases,

rather than ordering concurrent terms or probation and
rehabilitation.

Because

the

terms

are

within

the

statutory parameters for the offenses, we conclude that
the terms are not unfair or unnecessarily harsh.
*2 We affirm the sentence in the consolidated cases.

Utah App.,2006.
State v. McGinnis

Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 496219 (Utah App.),
2006 UT App 85
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